

Message Text

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12/21

ACTION EA-10

INFO OCT-01 NEA-09 ISO-00 IO-10 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

INR-07 L-02 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 OMB-01 NIC-01 AID-05 EUR-12 DPW-01 SR-02

ORM-01 FDRE-00 /097 W
----- 093488

R 110150Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7512

INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK

AMEMBASSY CANBERRA

AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR

AMEMBASSY MANILA

AMEMBASSY SAIGON

AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L JAKARTA 4295

CORRECTED COPY (ADDING EO, TAGS, AND SUBJ LINES)

DEPT PASS TO PHNOM PENH IF DESIRED

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS : PFOR CB VS TH ID

SUBJ: GOI VIEWS ON CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM

SUMMARY: I CALLED ON FONDEP'S DIRGEN FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS
DJAADININGRAT APRIL 10 TO EXPLORE LATEST GOI VIEWS ON INDO-
CHINA SITUATION INCLUDING POSSIBLE GOI AND ASEAN EFFORTS TO
PROMOTE KHMER PEACE. HE SAID GOI CONTINUES TO SEEK AVENUE
FOR KHMER NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH NOTHING SPECIFIC ACCOMPLISHED
THUS FAR, AND EXPRESSED KEEN INTEREST IN U.S. INTENTIONS.
END SUMMARY.

1. KHMER NEGOTIATIONS: DJAADININGRAT SAID GOI AND ASEAN
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GOVERNMENTS ARE INTERESTED IN SEEKING "AVENUE FOR DIALOGUE"

BETWEEN KHMER FORCES TO STOP FIGHTING. HE MENTIONED NO SPECIFIC ASEAN EFFORTS, BUT CONFIRMED THAT LONG BORET HAD HELD MEETING IN BANGKOK IN CONNECTION WITH GKR EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE WITH KHMER ROUGE; HE DID NOT KNOW WITH WHOM LONG BORET HAD MET OR OUTCOME. THERE IS POSSIBILITY, HE SAID, THAT MALIK MAY INVOLVE HIMSELF IN SOME WAY IN THIS EFFORT WHEN HE STOPS IN BANGKOK ON WAY BACK TO JAKARTA FROM VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA APRIL 11 OR 12. HE SAID GOI'S IMPRESSION IS THAT LONG BORET IS ATTEMPTING TO UPHOLD GKR POSITION, WHEREAS OTHER GKR ELEMENTS ARE NOW RESIGNED TO SURRENDERING IN VIEW OF MILITARY SITUATION.

2. DJAJADININGRAT SAID GOI HAS APPEALED TO SOME NON-ALIGNED GOVERNMENTS (HE IMPLIED ALGERIA WAS AMONG THESE) TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT. BUT HE SAID GOI IS NOT OPTIMISTIC ABOUT POSSIBLE NON-ALIGNED ROLE IN KHMER BECAUSE MOST NOW BELIEVE MILITARY SITUATION IN KHMER FAVORS ULTIMATE VICTORY FOR KHMER ROUGE. HE ADDED THAT, NEVERTHELESS, GOI STILL HOPES THAT IF LON NOL MUST GO, TRANSITION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT FURTHER BLOOD-SHED; GOI IS THEREFORE STILL SEARCHING FOR WAYS TO FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.

3. ICCS: DJAJAININGRAT SAID GOI STILL PLANS TO HOLD ON IN ICCS WHILE WAITING TO "SEE WHAT HAPPENS." HE NOTED THAT IF INDONESIA DOES WITHDRAW FORM ICCS, IRAN WILL PROBABLY FOLLOW GOI LEAD. IN ANY CASE, HE SAID DECISION ON GOI WITHDRAWAL WILL BE MADE IN JAKARTA, NOT BY GENERAL SUHUD IN SAIGON.

4. U.S. INTENTIONS: DJAJADININGRAT SAID GOI WOULD APPRECIATE CLEAREST EXPRESSION OF U.S. INTENTIONS IN BOTH KHMER AND VIETNAM, IN ORDER TO PLAN ITS OWN INDONESIAN POLICY, NOTING THAT U.S. AND INDONESIA SHARE COMMON INTERESTS IN INDOCHINA. HE QUERIED ME AT LENGTH ABOUT MILITARY SITUATION AND ATTITUDES OF EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS IN WASHINGTON, AND EXPRESSED PARTICULAT INTEREST IN REPORTS THAT U.S. SHIPS AND MARINES LYING OFFSHORE IN CAMBODIAN AND SOUTH VIETNAMESE WATERS. HE SAID THESE REPORTS HAVE CREATED IMPRESSION THAT U.S. MIGHT BE CONTEM-
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PLATING NEW MILITARY INTERVENTION. WHEN I EXPLAINED MARINES AND HELICOPTERS WERE THERE PURELY ON CONTIN- GENCY BASIS RELATED POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF U.S. PERSONNEL AND OTHERS, IF NECESSARY, HE SAID THIS EXPLANATION WAS REASSURING. I STRESSED CONGRESSIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON ANY RENEWAL U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT.

5. DJAJADININGRAT SAID GOI VALUED GENERAL BROWN'S CANDID

ASSESSMENT OF MILITARY SITUATION IN CAMBODIA AND VIETNAM DURING HIS RECENT VISIT. GOI REGOGNIZES U.S. DIFFICULTIES IN INDOCHINA AND IS NOT INTERESTED IN "FINDING FAULT" HE SAID, STRESSING AGAIN THMT IT NEEDS FACTS IN ORDER TO MAKE ITS OWN PLANS.

6. REFUGEE RELIEF: IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION ABOUT POSSIBLE PARTICIPATION IN REFUGEE RELIEF BY ASEAN NATIONS, HE SAID ASEAN GROUP IS CONTEMPLATING SUPPORTING RELIEF EFFORT "IN PRINCIPLE," BUT SAID AS PRACTICAL MATTER ASEAN NATIONS HAD LITTLE TO OFFER. AS FOR POSSIBLE INDONESIAN OFFER OF ASYLUM FOR REFUGEES FROM KHMER OR SOUTH VIETNAM, HE SAID THIS WOULD CREATE "UNENDING" DIFFICULTIES FOR GOI, NOTING THAT TOLD SAME THING TO AUSTRALIAN AMBASSADOR WOOLCOTT, WHO ALSO RAISED THIS QUESTION.

7. THE FUTURE OF VIETNAM: DJAJADININGRAT OBSERVED SEVERAL FACTORS THAT OFFER SOME HOPE THAT COMMUNISTS MAY NOT ACHIEVE TOTAL VICTORY IN VIETNAM, SUCH AS COMPLEX NATURE OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE SOCIETY AND POLITICS AND POSSIBILITY THAT THERE MIGHT STILL BE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HANOI AND PRG. HE EXPRESSED PERSONAL VIEW THAT IF NORTH VIETNAM DOES PREVAIL MILITARILY, THERE WILL BE PERIOD OF RECONSTRUCTION AND RECONCILIATION IN VIETNAM THAT WILL GIVE INDONESIA NAD OTHER SEA COUNTRIES RESPITE. I ASKED IF UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES ASEAN NATIONS WOULD WELCOME MEMBERSHIP OF A COMMUNIST VIETNAM INTO ASEAN. THEY DEFINITELY WOULD, HE SAID, IF VIETNAMESE REGIME IS NOT EXPANSIONIST AND IS WILLING TO BE GOOD NEIGHBOR.

8. THAILAND: TURNING TO THAILAND, DJAJADININGRAT ACKNOWLEDGED FEARS ABOUT ITS FUTURE AMONG SOME INDONESIAN MILITARY ELEMENTS, BUT SAID, IN GENERAL GOI IS "CAUTIOUSLY CONFIDENTIAL

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OPTIMISTIC" ABOUT THAILAND'S FUTURE BECAUSE OF ITS INDEPENDENT TRADITION, ROLE OF KING AND CONSTRUCTIVE NEW ATTITUDE OF THAI MILITARY TOWARD DEVELOPMENT OF DEMOCRACY. NEWSOM

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